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“Citizenship is man’s basic right, for it is nothing less than
the right to have rights. Remove this priceless possession and
there remains a stateless person, disgraced and degraded in
the eyes of his countrymen.”
–Chief Justice Earl Warren1

INTRODUCTION
Inside a tent, one of a dozen in a small refugee camp in Lebanon’s Bekaa
Valley, rests seven-month-old Nour, a child of Syrian refugees. She is the first
child of her Syrian parents to be born outside of Syria.2 Investigative journalist
John Davison documents the struggle of Nour’s family as they navigate the
incomprehensible landscape of nationality law in Lebanon, all while attempting

*
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1
Perez v. Brownell, 365 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren, J., dissenting).
2
John Davison, Redrawing the Middle East: A Generation of Syrian Children Who Don’t Count,
THOMPSON REUTERS (May 3, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/syria-refugeesstateless/.
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to survive under dire conditions.3 Nour’s family fled their native town of Homs
at the beginning of the Syrian Civil war.4 After two hours spent aboard a
crowded bus, her pregnant mother, father, and two siblings traveled seventy
miles into Lebanon where Nour was eventually born.5 Because Nour was born
outside of Syria, she must be registered at a government office in Lebanon by
her first birthday in early September.6 If they fail to do so, Nour potentially faces
the consequences that so many stateless children face: lacking a fundamental
legal recognition of nationality.7 For Nour to be fully recognized as a Syrian
national, her parents will need to navigate a maze of legal hurdles requiring the
family to journey to government offices, traverse military checkpoints, and
finally approach the Syrian embassy, which many refugees are justifiably scared
to do.8
According to a report produced by the UNHCR in 2014, more than ten
million people in the world are stateless.9 Statelessness occurs due to a number
of factors, including: political instability; conflicts of law; complex and
inefficient administrative practices; ethnic, racial, and gender discrimination;
and even arbitrary deprivations of citizenship rights.10 These factors illustrate
immense structural inconsistencies that exist between domestic citizenship
processes and human rights obligations under international law. It is often,
however, that these structural shortcomings are only exposed in the wake of
large-scale armed conflict that produces mass exoduses from war-torn nations.11
This is most evident in the case of the Syrian conflict, as current domestic
legislation in Syria has produced inefficient, if not obstructive policies that, in
turn, perpetuate human rights violations against fleeing citizens. Even a cursory
examination of domestic Syrian nationality law illustrates the unfortunate reality
facing vulnerable stateless populations and the insurmountable challenges they
face when fleeing zones of conflict.12
The discriminatory nature of the Syrian Nationality Law presents enormous
obstacles for future generations of displaced Syrian families.13 Syrian nationality
regulations are predominately paternalistic, meaning that citizenship can only be

3

Id.
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.; see also INST. ON STATELESSNESS & INCLUSION, THE WORLD’S STATELESS (2014),
http://www.institutesi.org/worldsstateless.pdf.
9
INST. ON STATELESSNESS & INCLUSION, supra note 8, at 55.
10
Id. at 23–27; see also Background Note on Gender Equality, Nationality Laws and Statelessness
2014, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.unhcr.org/4f5886306.pdf
[hereinafter Background Note].
11
See generally INST. ON STATELESSNESS & INCLUSION, supra note 8; Background Note, supra note
10.
12
Elveda Dana Gale, Statelessness Risk of Syrian Refugee Children Born in Turkey 53 (2016)
(unpublished
LLM
Thesis,
Tilburg
University
Law
School)
(available
at
http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=141265).
13
Background Note, supra note 10 (“In Syria, mothers can only confer nationality if the child was
born in Syria and the father does not establish filiation in relation to the child. Syria has a safeguard in
place to prevent statelessness among children born in the territory but is not clear that this is implemented
in practice.”).
4
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passed through the father.14 Due to immense casualties during the Syrian
conflict, children born without paternal ancestors are particularly vulnerable to
the ugly reality of statelessness.15 Furthermore, as the conflict ensues, births are
often not recorded in an official registry, and children born in exile are especially
susceptible to the realities of a lack of attributed nationality.16 As millions flee
their homes and abandon all but their most necessary belongings, many do not
carry official documentation.17 As a result, this lack of identification threatens
the future security of Syrian families, and most notably, their children.
This Note seeks to illustrate structural inconsistencies between domestic
nationality law and human rights obligations under international law.
Furthermore, this Note seeks to emphasize the difficulties that arise when
addressing statelessness in the context of customary international law, as current
domestic frameworks are inadequate to address its magnitude, specifically in
light of the modern Syrian refugee crisis. Though the status of refugees, and
specifically the problem of statelessness, has theoretically been addressed under
certain Conventions in the latter half of the twentieth century, such Conventions
lack necessary mechanisms in and of themselves to effectively allay the
statelessness problem.
The right to nationality represents far more than legal classification, as Chief
Justice Earl Warren once described, it is inherently “the right to have rights.”18
In light of the fundamental connection between citizenship and the rights,
protections, and privileges that flow forth from its possession, this Note argues
that obligations under customary international law that exist for the protection
of guaranteed human dignities should be honored, and domestic legislation that
obstructs these obligations must be modified. It is imperative to recognize the
inherent tensions between international customary norms and sovereign
authority to make citizenship determinations. Addressing principles of
citizenship through norms of customary international law is problematic,
though, as it strains credulity to argue that such matters are met with
consistency.19

14
See id. See generally Priyanka Boghani, A Staggering New Death Toll for Syria’s War — 470,000,
PBS (Feb. 11, 2016) http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/a-staggering-new-death-toll-for-syriaswar-470000/ (“More than 1 in 10 Syrians have been wounded or killed since the beginning of the war in
2011, according to a new report that finds a staggering 470,000 deaths have been caused by the conflict,
either directly or indirectly. . . . ‘Hundreds of thousands of people, particularly male breadwinners, have
[been] killed, injured, arrested, and kidnapped, enormously endangering their lives and the living
conditions of their families,’ the report said. ‘The widespread insecurity and unbearable economic
conditions and hardship, have forced millions of Syrians to resettle inside or outside the country and to
depend completely on local and international humanitarian aids. This loss of security in all its forms has
compromised human rights and dignity of the Syrian population.’”).
15
Boghani, supra note 14.
16
Id.
17
Amit Sen, Lacking a Nationality, Some Refugees From Syria Face Acute Risks, U.N. HIGH
COMM’R FOR REFUGEES (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.unhcr.org/52b45bbf6.html (“The issue of
statelessness – individuals who have no officially recognized nationality – is a problem for some Syrian
refugees. A 2013 survey in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq found that some 10 per cent of Syrian Kurdish
refugees are stateless, as many were forced to flee Syria before they could apply for nationality or were
not eligible because they had never been registered by the Syrian authorities.”).
18
Perez v. Brownell, 365 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren, J., dissenting).
19
See Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and
International Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 287 (1995).
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In the latter half of the twentieth century, international courts have
traditionally placed less emphasis on consistency of state practice in recognition
of customary obligations in matters of humanitarian rights.20 It is imperative to
note, however, that the current international legal framework leaves matters of
citizenship determinations entirely within the purview of the nation-state.21
Certainly, it would be ideal for an obligation under customary international law
to a right to nationality to be honored. However, in order to address the
statelessness crisis in the wake of the Syrian conflict, the inquiry must begin
with the reform of obstructive domestic legislation that contravenes international
human rights obligations.
The following section of this Note explores the history of the Syrian conflict
– its origins, its progression, and its effect on massive segments of the Syrian
population. Part II provides a background of customary international law, and in
turn, Part III explores the international framework for decisions of nationality,
and it explores the global normative framework for protection of human rights
in conjunction with citizenship determinations. Part IV provides insight into
Syrian Nationality Law, and the consequences of the statutory framework that
have left its displaced population further vulnerable to statelessness. This section
emphasizes the ethnic and gender discrimination practices that are inherent in
Syrian nationality legislation and how such practices not only render Syrian
nationality processes ineffective but also inhibit segments of the population from
acquiring a nationality. Part V illustrates the realities that are confronted by
countries neighboring Syria, and it illustrates the immense political, economic,
and administrative burdens faced by these nations in the wake of the Syrian
conflict. Part VI provides concluding remarks on the current state of the
statelessness problem, and it urges that though there exists inherent tensions
between international and sovereign authority over citizenship determinations,
norms of fundamental human rights must come to supersede sovereignty
considerations with respect to the creation of stateless persons.

I. HISTORY OF THE SYRIAN CONFLICT

Estimates suggest that nearly 465,000 Syrians have lost their lives in five
and a half years of armed conflict, which began with anti-government protests
before escalating into a full-scale civil war.22 As a result, 6.1 million persons
have been internally displaced, and 4.8 million are seeking refuge abroad.23
Forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad and those opposed to his rule have
engaged in bitter conflict, and citizens caught between the government and the
20

Id.
See U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S REFUGEES: A
HUMANITARIAN AGENDA (Jan. 1, 1997), http://www.unhcr.org/3eb7ba7d4.html; Michelle Foster &
Hélène Lambert, Statelessness as a Human Rights Issue: A Concept Whose Time has Come, 28 INT’L J.
REFUGEE L. 564, 572 (2016).
22
Syria's Civil War Explained from the Beginning, AL JAZEERA (Apr. 14, 2018),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/05/syria-civil-war-explained-160505084119966.html.
23
HUMAN
RIGHTS
WATCH,
WORLD
REPORT
2017,
at
571
(2017),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/wr2017-web.pdf.
21
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opposition have found little recourse but to flee their life-long homes.24 As
remains true, tensions have been further escalated by the actions of jihadist
militants from the Islamic State.25
The Syrian conflict began as a result of events surrounding what became
known as the “Arab Spring.”26 In 2011, protests toppled the regimes of Tunisian
President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali27 and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.28
In March of the same year, peaceful protests arose in Syria as well, after fifteen
boys were detained and tortured for having written graffiti in support of the Arab
Spring.29 “The people want the fall of the regime,” the boys wrote.30 Ultimately,
one of the boys, 13-year-old Hamza al-Khateeb, was killed after having been
cruelly tortured.31 In July 2011, military defectors proclaimed the formation of
the Free Syrian Army.32 This rebel group sought to overthrow the government,
and slowly Syria descended into civil war.33
As conflict ensued, civil unrest was met with an abrupt, violent crackdown
by government forces.34 Calls for freedom grew louder, and Assad left
destruction in his wake. In the early years of the rebellion, each weekly
demonstration was attributed a “tag-line,” typically constituted by the simple,
yet powerful words of sermons given by sympathetic imams during mid-day
prayers.35 This tradition was rebirthed in 2016, and it was reflected in a daily,
unrelenting call to action––“the revolution continues.”36 As the civil war in Syria
progressed, millions were forced to flee their homes, exposing an inefficient

24

Syria's Civil War Explained from the Beginning, supra note 22.
Syria: The Story of the Conflict, BBC NEWS (Mar. 11, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/worldmiddle-east-26116868 (The “Islamic State has capitalised on the chaos and taken control of large swathes
of Syria and Iraq, where it proclaimed the creation of a ‘caliphate’ in June 2014. Its many foreign fighters
are involved in a ‘war within a war’ in Syria, battling rebels and rival jihadists from the al-Qaeda-affiliated
Nusra Front, as well as government and Kurdish forces.”).
26
Arab Uprising: Country by Country–Tunisia, BBC NEWS (Dec. 16, 2013),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-12482315 (“The downfall of Tunisia’s President Zine al-Abidine Ben
Ali inspired pro-democracy activists across the Arab world. Widespread discontent at economic hardship,
decades of autocratic rule and corruption erupted into mass demonstrations in December 2010 after a
young, unemployed man, Mohamed Bouazizi set fire to himself after officials stopped him selling
vegetables in Sidi Bouzid. Around 300 people were killed during the subsequent unrest, which forced
Ben Ali to resign in January 2011, after 23 years in power, and go into exile in Saudi Arabia. He was later
sentenced to life in prison in absentia.”).
27
Angelique Chrisafis & Ian Black, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali Forced to Flee Tunisia as Protesters
Claim Victory, GUARDIAN (Jan. 15, 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/14/tunisianpresident-flees-country-protests.
28
Profile:
Hosni
Mubarak,
AL
JAZEERA
(Feb.
11,
2011),
http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/2009/12/200912693048491779.html.
29
Kelly McEvers, Revisiting the Spark That Kindled the Syrian Uprising, NPR (Mar. 16, 2012),
http://www.npr.org/2012/03/16/148719850/revisiting-the-spark-that-kindled-the-syrian-uprising.
30
Id.
31
Tortured and Killed: Hamz al-Khateeb, Age 13, AL JAZEERA (May 31, 2011),
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/05/201153185927813389.html.
32
Syria's Civil War Explained from the Beginning, supra note 22.
33
Id.
34
Louisa Loveluck, Hundreds Across Syria protest Against Assad for the First Time in Years,
TELEGRAPH
(Mar.
4,
2016),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/12183779/Hundreds-across-Syriaprotest-against-Assad-for-the-first-time-in-years.html.
35
Id.
36
Id.
25
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administrative regional infrastructure that was rendered incapable of dealing
with the massive flight of peoples from zones of conflict.37
The consequences of the Syrian conflict have exposed the growing problem
of statelessness in the affected region and its global ramifications.38 In addition,
the complexities, inconsistencies, and the structurally discriminatory nature of
citizenship law in the region and particularly in Syria have contributed
immensely to the global statelessness population.39 As a result, it is necessary
that the international community respond, and in turn, resolve to address the
statelessness crisis confronting refugees fleeing zones of conflict by honoring
commitments under widely-accepted human rights conventions. The following
section will provide foundational principles regarding obligations under
customary international law. In the section that follows next, this Note will
explore the global normative framework of nationality. In turn, and more
critically, this Note will assess the responsibility of nations under humanitarian
treaties at international law, specifically in the context of customary obligations
in the realm of human rights, to aid in the current statelessness crisis in the Syrian
region.

II. AN EXAMINATION OF OBLIGATIONS UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW
The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) describes customary international
law as “a general practice accepted as law.”40It is widely recognized that the
existence of a rule of customary international law requires the presence of two
distinct elements: (1) state practice; and (2) a subjective belief that such practice
is required, prohibited or allowed, depending on the formulation of the doctrine,
as a matter of law (opinio juris).41 The opinions of the Permanent Court of
International Justice (“PCIJ”) and those of the ICJ have repeatedly
acknowledged that the existence of a customary rule of international law
requires each of these two elements.42

37
Syria's Civil War Explained from the Beginning, supra note 22; see also Gale, supra note 12, at
50–51.
38
Louise Osborne & Ruby Russell, Refugee Crisis Creates ‘Stateless Generation’ of Children in
Limbo, GUARDIAN (Dec. 27, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/27/refugee-crisiscreating-stateless-generation-children-experts-warn.
39
Gale, supra note 12, at 53.
40
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 933
(Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ also contains the modern definition of customary international law:
“[t]he Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are
submitted to it, shall apply . . . (b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law.”).
41
Michael P. Scharf, Accelerated Formation of Customary International Law, 20 ILSA J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 305, 305 (2014) (citation omitted).
42
Id. at 311.
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A. STATE PRACTICE
Traditionally, in establishing whether a certain doctrine has become a
customary rule of international law, jurists have placed most emphasis on state
conduct.43 In assessing state practice, it must be sufficiently “dense” to establish
a rule of customary international law.44 The ICJ has established that “constant
and uniform usage” is required for establishing a customary rule.45 There is not
a definitive length of time that is required for certain practices to be sufficiently
considered customary, as the ICJ stated in the North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases:
Although the passage of only a short period of time is not
necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of
customary international law on the basis of what was originally
a purely conventional rule, an indispensable requirement
would be that within the period in question, short though it
might be, State practice, including that of States whose
interests are specially affected, should have been both
extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision
invoked;- and should moreover have occurred in such a way as
to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal
obligation is involved.46
The principles of uniformity and consistency of practice are largely a matter of
interpretation.47 Complete uniformity of practice is not required, though
substantial uniformity must be established for the state practice element to be
satisfied.48 In Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua,
when the Court analyzed the customary nature of the principles of nonintervention, the ICJ stated that:
It is not to be expected that in the practice of States the
application of the rules in question should have been perfect,
in the sense that States should have refrained, with complete
consistency . . . The Court does not consider that, for a rule to
be established as customary, the corresponding practice must
be in absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule. In order to
deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it
sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general, be
consistent with such rules, and that instances of State conduct
43

Id. at 312.
Sir Claud Humphrey Meredith Waldock, General Course on Public International Law (Vol. 106),
in COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1962).
45
Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), Judgment, 1950 I.C.J. 266, at 276 (Nov. 20).
46
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Ger. v. Den.; Ger. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 74 (Feb.
20).
47
Id.
48
Id. (“State practice, including that of States whose interests are specially affected, should have been
both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked; - and should moreover have
occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved.”).
44
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inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been
treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the
recognition of a new rule.49
If consistency and uniformity of practice is established, formation of a
customary rule does not require a specific passage of time in order for it to be
effective,50 as exemplified by the rules of airspace and the rules affecting the
continental shelf which have come into effect following a short period of
uniformity.51 The second element of establishing a rule of customary
international law is opinio juris.
B. SUBJECTIVE ELEMENT: OPINIO JURIS
In order to establish a rule of customary international law, it has been
emphasized that such an establishment requires not only evidence of state
practice but also a subjective belief that the state is bound to abide by the doctrine
in question, known as opinio juris sive necessitatis, abbreviated as opinio juris.52
Further, it is established that the nation must follow the practice because of
opinio juris rather than because “of the demands of courtesy, reciprocity,
political expediency or comity.”53 In the 1985 Continental Shelf Case, the ICJ
declared that customary international law must be sought “primarily in the actual
practice and opinio juris of States.”54 In addition, in the 1969 Continental Shelf
Cases, the ICJ proclaimed that:
Not only must the acts concerned [constituting state practice]
amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or
carried out in such a way, as to evidence a belief that this
practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule
requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e. the existence of a
subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of the opinio
juris sive necessitatis. The States concerned must therefore feel
that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal
obligation.55

49
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 I.C.J.
14, ¶ 186 (June 27) [hereinafter Military and Paramilitary Activities].
50
JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (8th ed. 2012).
51
Id.
52
Military and Paramilitary supra note 49, ¶ 207 (“for a new customary rule to be formed, not only
must the acts concerned ‘amount to a settled practice’, but they must be accompanied by opinio juris sive
neccessitatis. Either the States taking such action or other States in a position to react to it, must have
behaved so that their conduct is ‘evidence of a belief that the practice is rendered obligatory by the
existence of a rule of law requiring it. The need for such belief . . . the subjective element, is implicit in
the very notion of opinio juris sive neccessitatis’.” (internal citations omitted)).
53
Brian D. Lepard, The Necessity of Opinio Juris in the Formation of Customary International Law
(July
12,
2013)
(discussion
paper
for
panel,
University
of
Geneva),
https://www.scribd.com/document/339913049/The-Necessity-of-Opinio-Juris-in-the-Formation-ofCustomary.
54
Id.
55
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Ger. v. Den.; Ger. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 77 (Feb.
20).

2018

COMBATING STATELESSNESS IN THE WAKE OF THE SYRIAN CONFLICT

139

As such, it is necessary for opinio juris to exist in concert with substantial
uniformity of state practice so as to establish an obligation under customary
international law. The following section will explore the international legal
framework of nationality, and it will address concerns regarding tensions
between sovereign authority over decisions of nationality and the evolving
global framework for the protection of human rights. In so doing, the argument
will be made that principles of customary international law have evolved in
manner such that states must, at least minimally, seek to avoid the creation of
stateless persons by perpetuating domestic citizenship regimes that discriminate
in a manner that exacerbates the statelessness problem. Though it is clear that
sovereign authority over citizenship decisions is paramount, norms of customary
international law have come to favor human rights protections in the twentieth
century.

III. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF NATIONALITY
A. TENSIONS BETWEEN SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
CONCERNING STATELESSNESS AND A RIGHT TO NATIONALITY
International law respects the inherent autonomy of sovereignty and
equality of individual states.56 Absent “consent to be bound,” a state is not
required to remain consistent with obligations under international law.57 In
addition, it is clear that principles of non-interference at international law
certainly preclude interference in the domestic jurisdiction of another state.58
Questions of nationality have principally been addressed as matters of domestic
jurisdiction falling within the authority of individual sovereigns.59 According to
Van Waas, however, the domestic actions of sovereign states can be affected by
the actions of other states under international law.60 In its Advisory Opinion on
the Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees of 1923, the Permanent Court of
International Justice stated, “[t]he question of whether a certain matter is or is
not solely within the domestic jurisdiction of a State is an essentially relative
question; it depends on the development of international relations.”61 The Court
continued, illustrating that norms of nationality law must ultimately conform to
obligations under customary international law:
For the purpose of the present opinion, it is enough to observe
that it may well happen that, in a manner which, like that of
nationality, is not, in principle, regulated by international law,
56
LAURA VAN WAAS, NATIONALITY MATTERS: STATELESSNESS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 36
(2008); see S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 18); see also Military
and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 49, ¶ 202.
57
VAN WAAS, supra note 56, at 36 n.26 (noting an important exception to this principle: that jus
cogens may not be violated, even absent explicit state consent).
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 4, at 24
(Feb. 7).
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the right of a State to use its discretion is nevertheless restricted
by obligations which it may have undertaken towards other
States. In such a case, jurisdiction which, in principle, belongs
solely to the State, is limited by rules of international law.62
It can be said that the Permanent Court left determinations of nationality
within the purview of domestic legislation. However, the Court made clear that
states are required to act consistently with obligations under customary
international law.63 The twentieth century has witnessed the evolution of
numerous foundational instruments that address citizenship determinations in
the context of human rights such as the 1930 Hague Convention, the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees, the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless
Persons, and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. An
examination of these instruments illustrates prevailing sentiment that norms of
customary international law have come to favor the protection of human rights.
As such, this section will proceed to explore the evolution of human rights norms
that indicate that customary international law has embraced the obligation to
avoid statelessness, yet in practice, there exists no practical remedy for millions
of displaced persons.
B. TWENTIETH CENTURY NATIONALITY LAW: A SHIFT TOWARDS HUMAN RIGHTS
PROTECTIONS
The first attempt to provide protections for the right to nationality was the
1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of
Nationality Laws (hereinafter “1930 Hague Convention”).64 Considered by
some scholars to be the most important multilateral agreement in the field of
nationality, the 1930 Hague Convention affirmed the delegation of exclusive
authority to sovereign states in matters of nationality.65 Under Chapter I, Article
I, the 1930 Hague Convention provides, “[i]t is for each State to determine under
its own laws who are its nationals.”66 The Convention continues, however, with
the following qualification, “[t]his law shall be recognized by other States in so
far as it is consistent with international conventions, international custom, and
the principles of law generally recognized with regard to nationality.”67 As such,
the means by which a state exercises its right to determine its citizens ought to
conform to provisions at international law. Notably, decisions at international
law during the latter half of the twentieth century have developed in favor of
human rights.68
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Under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereinafter “1948
UDHR”), adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10
December 1948, “nationality” is codified as a basic human right.69 Under Article
15 of the Declaration, “[e]veryone has the right to a nationality.”70 Further, “[n]o
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change
his nationality.”71 The 1948 UDHR, however, neither provides mechanisms for
enforcement of these principles, nor does it indicate that statelessness violates
customary international law.72 Even absent such features, the 1948 UDHR exists
as the foundation for the codification of human rights in the international legal
system in the latter half of the twentieth century.73
At the time of its adoption by the General Assembly, it was clear that the
1948 UDHR did not establish binding obligations on signatories, rather, it
existed as a “manifesto with primarily moral authority.”74 An examination of the
1948 UDHR, in and of itself, however, does not end the inquiry into whether its
principles have attained customary character. Though it is arguably clear that
international courts have developed inconsistent jurisprudence in their pursuit to
analyze the existence of both state practice and opinio juris,75 one leading
scholar illustrates that the former is of less importance in the context of human
rights.76 He notes that the International Court of Justice’s recent approach
“accords limited significance to state practice, especially to inconsistent or
contrary practice, and attributes central normative significance to resolutions
both of the United Nations General Assembly and of other international
organizations. . . The burden of proof to be discharged in establishing custom in
the field of human or humanitarian rights is thus less onerous than in other fields
of international law.”77
What is clear, however, is that decisions of citizenship determination remain
within the purview of the sovereign state, so it may be successfully argued that
interference with the right of nation-states to make such decisions is an
encroachment on sovereignty. Thus, it is appropriate to address the statelessness
crisis through the lens of the normative influence of accession to international
humanitarian conventions that provide for obligations that should be honored in
order to avoid exacerbation of the statelessness problem.
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C. CONVENTIONS CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM OF STATELESSNESS
1. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
The first Convention that specifically addressed refugees and stateless
individuals was the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the
1951 Convention). The 1951 Convention arose in similar fashion to the 1948
UDHR, as the international community sought to rectify and prohibit the
atrocities committed by the Nazis during the Second World War. Notably, the
1951 Convention sought to establish the simple command that refugees were in
need of protection from persecution.78 The 1951 Convention acknowledged the
existence of statelessness, as it explicitly provided refugee protections to persons
lacking a nationality who feared persecution on one of the five delineated
grounds: race, religion, nationality, member of a particular social group, or
political opinion.79 While the 1951 Convention served a valuable purpose in
establishing legal recognition of stateless persons, it did very little to combat
statelessness and reduce its prevalence.80 Nonetheless, many of the rights later
codified in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights (ICESR), the 1954
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (the 1954 Convention),
and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (the 1961
Convention) are preceded by the 1951 Convention. The 1951 Convention
initiated a process that “entrenched and enhanced prior state practice”81 of
addressing statelessness in the international arena.
2. The 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons
Two United Nations conventions specifically address the problem of
statelessness. The first was the 1954 Convention (entered into force in 1960).
The 1954 Convention possesses narrowly tailored purposes: to define a class of
stateless persons, to regulate and improve their status, and to assure to them the
widest possible exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms.82 In defining a
class of stateless persons, Article 1 of the 1954 Convention defined a stateless
person as “a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the
operation of its laws.”83 The 1954 Convention was intended to improve the
position of stateless persons by regulating their status, and by providing that
basic rights of stateless persons be respected by their countries of residence
without discrimination of race, religion, or nation of origin. Further, the 1954
Convention mandates that the host country provide “the same treatment as is
accorded to aliens generally,” except in places where the Convention provides
78
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees pmbl., July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S.
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more favorable protections, including documentation (Article 27 and 28), and
security from arbitrary expulsion (Article 31).84 However, the initiative to reduce
statelessness required further international cooperation and an alignment of
domestic laws.
3. The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness
The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness was the additional
instrument that the international community had long awaited. One of the most
important parts of the 1961 Convention is that it imposes positive obligations on
States to grant nationality under certain circumstances, which contrasted with
the primarily negative obligations on States that were imposed in the 1930
Hague Convention.85 For example, Article 1 of the 1961 Convention requires a
State party to grant nationality to a person born in its territory who would
otherwise be left stateless,86 though the state does retain autonomy to proscribe
certain conditions to this mandate. Under the 1961 Convention, state parties are
required to provide mechanisms for persons born on/in their territory to acquire
nationality.87 In addition, the 1961 Convention provides limitations as to when
a State could rid a person of their nationality in the absence of acquiring
another.88 Further, the 1961 Convention affirmatively addresses the problem of
general equality norms with regard to citizenship law.89 The 1961 Convention
illustrates that it is necessary to establish a link between the loss or denial of
nationality and the loss or denial of national protection. It is ultimately through
the understanding that in the absence of nationality, fundamental human rights
ensured by national protection may be infringed, and in turn, that international
consensus must arise that a right to nationality has become a part of customary
international law. This is further evidenced by the fact that the entrustment of
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this responsibility has been placed in the hands of the UNHCR by the General
Assembly of the United Nations.
D. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE FULFILLMENT OF
CONVENTION OBLIGATIONS
The UNHCR is entrusted by the General Assembly to fulfill the functions
delineated under Article 11 of the 1961 Convention.90 When the 1961
Convention came into force, the UNHCR assumed the Article 11
responsibilities, “of a body to which a person claiming the benefit of this
Convention may apply for the examination of his claim and for assistance in
presenting it to the appropriate authority.”91 For much of the latter half of the
twentieth century, the UNHCR has served as an important intermediary between
stateless persons and respective host states in order to resolve legal questions of
nationality.92 As such, this intermediary position serves as a significant reference
point for consensus on state practice concerning nationality and the problem of
statelessness. Indeed, though there are a minimal number of signatories to the
1961 Convention, it may be argued that “other human rights treaties have also
become important in the protections of stateless persons.”93 Among such
standards proclaimed by the 1961 Convention and other human rights
conventions, minimally, is an obligation to avoid the creation of stateless
persons.94
E. THE CUSTOMARY RIGHT TO NATIONALITY
Though it is clear that international law has traditionally afforded sovereign
discretion to states with respect to their nationality processes, such autonomy
has been considerably restricted by progress in international human rights law.95
Because the formal attribution of nationality is the link through which persons
are afforded rights, privileges and protections at both domestic and international
law, it is critical that nations honor the right to nationality as codified under
Article 15 of the 1948 UDHR.96 The human rights system is rooted in the
principle of universality, and statelessness should not be an obstacle to the
enjoyment of human rights protections at international law.
Finding customary obligations to an absolute right of nationality is
problematic, however, in part, because it is difficult to ascertain consistency of
state practice in matters of citizenship determination.97 In addition, accession to
the 1951 Convention, the 1954 Convention, and the 1961 Convention is far from
90
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universal.98 However, the UNHCR reports that from 2011 to 2015 there were 49
accessions to the two statelessness Conventions, indicating some progress in
recent years by states.99 Because illustrating consistency of state practice in
nationality processes is impractical, it is necessary to emphasize specific
obligations that have attained more universal customary character that directly
affect domestic citizenship practices. Consequently, rather than attempting to
delineate broad obligations and duties upon states regarding permanent
acquisition of nationality through vague background principles of human rights,
it is prudent to illustrate specific facets of domestic citizenship frameworks that,
if reconciled with obligations under international human rights law, would serve
to better alleviate the global statelessness problem. What remains in the absence
of universal accession, however, at a minimum, are foundational principles of
non-discrimination and protection against arbitrary deprivation that can be said
to have attained more universal character.100
As will be explored in the following section, though, the right to
nationality is codified in the 1948 UDHR.101 The practical reality in the wake of
widespread, prolonged conflict is that millions of displaced persons do not have
access to necessary administrative processes to realize their fundamental human
right to nationality.102 The unparalleled burden faced by neighboring countries
renders it impossible to provide necessary services to the massive influx of
immigrants.103 Though principles of non-discrimination in matters of nationality
determination appear to have achieved universal character, the reality for
persons left stateless as a result of the Syrian conflict is that domestic legislation
in the region maintains discriminatory provisions that obstruct access to
citizenship. This note urges, in part, that the maintenance of such discriminatory
legislation contravenes obligations under international law and, in turn,
contributes to the creation of stateless persons. Further, as international law has
developed to favor the protection of human rights, it may be argued that
domestic autonomy over citizenship determinations is restricted when domestic
legislation contributes to the creation of stateless persons.
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IV. THE OBSTACLES PROVIDED BY SYRIAN NATIONALITY LEGISLATION
AND ATTEMPTS AT REFORM

Amidst the chaos and destruction, hundreds of thousands of Syrian families
are left vulnerable as they flee their homes. Refugees have been forced to settle
in distant foreign lands, often without proper documentation for themselves, and
in many cases for their children.104 Such confusion amidst this chaotic struggle
has allowed the fundamental problem of statelessness to rear its ugly head. The
conflict has proved to further complicate the difficult systems of nationality law
in the region, and it has left many, especially women and children, without
recourse to establish their fundamental human right to a nationality.105 The
following section will explore the Syrian Nationality Law, illustrating its
complexities and most critically its discriminatory practices that indicate the
demonstrable need for a call to action from the international community.
A. SYRIAN NATIONALITY LAW
The Syrian Nationality Act was established on November 20, 1969 under
decree number 276, following the coming to power of the Baath regime.106 In
1976, the enacting regulations were issued and there have been no amendments
to the legislation since then.107 The Syrian Nationality Act is deficient in three
respects: first, its adherence to strict, patriarchal jus sanguinis principles
perpetuate statelessness through gender discrimination in the acquisition of
citizenship;108 second, though Syrian naturalization provisions are theoretically
accessible, decisions of naturalization are discretionary in nature and perpetuate
discriminatory practices against certain ethnic groups;109 and third, the Syrian
Nationality Act runs in contravention of Syria’s obligations under international
law.110 The deficiencies of Syrian Nationality legislation are further exacerbated
by the current conflict in Syria, as the forced displacement of millions have left
many to the vulnerabilities of statelessness and without protection.
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B. THE PRAGMATIC CONSEQUENCES OF GENDER DISCRIMINATION UNDER SYRIAN
NATIONALITY LAWS
In Syria, the primary means by which one acquires nationality is through
paternalistic jus sanguinis,111 meaning that a right to citizenship is passed to a
child who is born of citizen parents. The 2012 Constitution of Syria (hereinafter
“2012 Constitution”), reiterating and reaffirming principles of the 1973 Syrian
Constitution (hereinafter “1973 Constitution”) theoretically indicates legal
equality for Syrian men and women, as it states under Article 33 Section 3,
“Citizens shall be equal in rights and duties without discrimination among them
on grounds of sex, origin, language, religion or creed.”112 However, under the
Syrian Nationality Law, citizenship is only passed to a child from a Syrian father.
Article 3(a) of the Syrian Nationality Law Legislative Decree 275 1969 states
that “anyone born inside or outside the country to a Syrian Arab father . . . shall
be considered as Syrian Arabs ipso facto.”113
Though the former mention of gender equality under Syrian Constitutional
Law should seemingly prevail, Syrian Nationality Law proscribes that jus
sanguinis principles are applied strictly by paternal lineage.114 Though Article
3(a) theoretically preserves the right to citizenship regardless of place of birth,
legislation in practice requires that children be able to prove their descent from
a Syrian father. Children who are unable to prove patriarchal Syrian lineage will
be unable to attain Syrian citizenship. In exceptional cases, Syrian Nationality
Law does provide protections to children unable to prove paternal lineage, so
long as the child is born within Syria.115 Such protection, however, is an empty
gesture for displaced families and leaves them without recourse.116
In recent decades, there have been attempts to reform Syria’s discriminatory
nationality law.117 In 2004, the Syrian Women’s League presented reformed
legislation in an attempt to expose and ultimately eliminate the discriminatory
phenomena produced by Syrian Nationality Legislation. This attempt to gain
equality, however, was rejected in 2008 on the basis that it contravened
provisions of Sharia law.118 Article 3 of the 1973 Constitution stipulates the two
following foundational principles, “1. Islam is the religion of the President of
the Republic; and, 2. Islamic jurisprudence shall be the main source of
legislation.”119 In turn, the 2012 Constitution “has secured the right of religious
111
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communities to draft discriminatory personal status laws.”120 The fourth
paragraph of Article 3 of the 2012 Constitution provides: “The personal status
of religious communities shall be protected and respected.”121 Such legislation
furthers principles of patriarchal guardianship over women, and as such can be
considered as “the legal criterion for women's rights” in Syria; meaning that
absent significant reform, “discriminatory effects will be reflected in civil laws,
particularly the Nationality Law.”122
The initiative for reform was revived in 2012, on the international plane,
during periodic review by the Committee on the Rights of the Child (hereinafter,
the “Committee”), when the Syrian government presented preparations of a draft
amendment to the nationality law that would permit women to confer citizenship
to children on an equal basis with Syrian men.123 Such an amendment would
have been a significant step in the right direction for Syrian women and children.
The Committee, however, merely iterated its concerns that the amendment had
yet to be addressed in Parliament.124 Additionally, and more critically, the bill
has yet to receive public attention. Absent significant, meaningful discussion in
the public forum, the likelihood that this critical legislation will pass is meager
at best. Furthermore, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, it is estimated that “[o]ne fourth of all Syrian refugee families are now
headed by women alone, as husbands and fathers have been forcibly separated
from families by war.”125 In the wake of such widespread destruction, it may
ultimately prove an insurmountable task for thousands of children to attain
fundamental human rights.
C. VIOLATING OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Syria’s discriminatory nationality legislation is in violation of the nation’s
obligations under international law. Syria is not party to the 1954 Convention
Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons or the 1961 Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness.126 Syria is, however, party to the Convention on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which obligates State
parties “to ensure that women and men have equal ability to acquire, change,
and retain their nationality and to confer their nationality to children and
spouses.”127 Article 9(1) of CEDAW requires that state parties “grant women
equal rights with men to acquire, change or retain their nationality.”128In
addition, Article 9(2) obligates state parties to “grant women equal rights with
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men with respect to the nationality of their children.”129Syria maintains a
reservation with respect to Article 9(2), however, it maintains no objection to
Article 9(1).130According to a report produced by the Institute on Statelessness
and Inclusion as a submission to the Human Rights Council at the 26th Session
of the Universal Periodic Review, the organization urges that “Article 9 among
others is ‘central to the object and purpose of the Convention and that the
reservations impact negatively on the enjoyment by women of their rights.’”131
Consequently, “the maintenance of nationality laws which discriminate on the
basis of gender are themselves in conflict with the object and purpose of the
Convention and with the general obligation of all state parties to ‘agree to pursue
by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating
discrimination against women.’”132
Syria is also party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).133 The ICCPR
requires that states ensure a child’s right to nationality under Article 24.134 In
addition, under Article 26, the instrument requires that all citizens be equal
before the law and not subject to discrimination on any ground, including
gender.135 Syria’s Nationality Law violates these provisions. With respect to the
CRC, Article 7 and Article 8 are especially relevant. Article 7 provides that a
child has “the right to acquire a nationality.”136 Article 8 obligates State Parties
to “undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity,
including nationality, name and family relations.”137 According to the Institute
on Statelessness and Inclusion, Articles 7 and 8 are to be read in conjunction
with CRC Article 2, which provides for nondiscrimination based on the gender
of the child or the parent, and Article 3, which states that the “best interest of the
Child shall be a primary consideration.”138 Thus, it is clear that as far as Syria’s
Nationality Law discriminates against women with respect to their ability to
confer citizenship to their children, the legislation contravenes Syria’s
obligations under international law.
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V. NEIGHBORING DOMESTIC RESPONSE AND POLITICAL REALITIES

The following section provides a survey of two countries neighboring Syria
that have registered the most Syrian asylum seekers: Turkey and Lebanon. This
section will illustrate the practical, legal, and administrative realities faced by
nations that have been most affected by mass flight from Syria due to prolonged
conflict. There are currently 2.8 million Syrians registered in Turkey139 and
nearly 1.5 million registered in Lebanon.140 As noted by journalist Elena
Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, this figure is best put into context by noting that during the
“so-called European ‘refugee-crisis’ a total of 884,461 Syrian refugees applied
for asylum across Europe between April 2011 and October 2016.”141 From an
empirical perspective, the burden felt by European countries pales in comparison
to that felt by neighboring countries, such as Turkey and Lebanon, as Syrians
flee across their borders in search of safety in person and dignity in life. Such
vast, forced migration places immense political and administrative strain on
neighboring countries.142 This strain, in turn, further complicates the ability of
refugees to navigate the necessary processes needed to achieve not only physical
separation from the conflict, but also legally recognized status in foreign nations.
A. THE IMPRACTICAL BURDEN OF REGIONAL RESOLUTION
1. Turkey
Turkey has been at the forefront of the reception of forced migrants from
Syria since the inception of the Syrian conflict.143 This can be attributed to the
fact that Turkey has retained an adamant, anti-Assad stance from the beginning
of the crisis, which further illustrates the Turkish government’s stake in the
future of Syria due to significant populations of Kurdish and Turkmen
populations.144 Additionally, such a stance also indicates a strategic interest in
being viewed as having a significant political role in the region by taking an
“active and direct role in the ongoing crisis.”145 In response to Assad’s lethal
crackdown on anti-government protests, Syrians began to flee across Turkish
borders in April 2011.146 During the same year, migration to Turkey ebbed and
flowed, and by the end of the year, only 8,000 Syrian refugees resided in
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Turkey.147 Forced migration escalated, however, when efforts to achieve a
cease-fire failed in 2012.148 As tensions with Assad’s government heightened
and militant jihadists continued to seize territory inside Syrian borders, forced
migration to Turkey exploded as 55,000 Syrians began seeking asylum per
month by late 2014.149 Turkish reception of forced Syrian migrants was initially
exceptionally welcoming, though evidence suggests that Turkish authorities
were quick to assume that the crisis would be temporary, and the reality of
prolonged migrant reception has begun to present ever-increasing difficulties.150
Though Turkey has acceded to the 1951 Convention on the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, the scope of the Convention’s applicability to
asylum seekers is limited. In addition, Turkey’s Settlement Act favors persons
of Turkish descent in determining eligibility for temporary citizenship and
eventual, possible citizenship. Though major changes in Turkey’s asylum
system have occurred, “most current asylum seekers are placed under
‘temporary protection’ for settlement in another country rather than being
accepted as refugees for settlement in Turkey.”151 Specifically, in the case of
Syrian migrants, rights and protections have been expanded since the beginning
of the conflict, however, “they remain barred from gaining regular refugee status
and instead are classified as beneficiaries of temporary protection.”152
This restriction on refugee protections exists because Turkey’s instrument
of accession to the 1951 Convention stipulates “that the Turkish government
will maintain a geographic limitation pursuant to the Convention’s article 1b,
limiting the scope of the Convention’s application in Turkey ‘only to persons
who have become refugees as a result of events occurring in Europe.’”153 As a
result, “‘Turkey can only legally accept European asylum seekers as ‘refugees’
stricto sensu,’ even though ‘the majority of asylum seekers in Turkey originate
from non-European states.’”154 This geographical limitation is not fully
implemented, however, as:
Turkey allows the . . . [UNHCR] to operate and conduct
refugee status determination procedures whereby refugee
status is jointly granted by the UNHCR and the Ministry of the
Interior with the underlying condition that accepted refugees
do not locally integrate but instead resettle in a third country.
Considering its geographical proximity to conflict- ridden
states, Turkey’s geographical limitation disqualifies a vast
number of asylum seekers and refugees seeking permanent
protection from the Turkish state.155
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The Law on Foreigners and International Protection, enacted in April 2013,
provides non-European refugees certain protections under one of three types of
temporary status: conditional refugee status, humanitarian residence permits, or
temporary protection.156 As most Syrian migrants are classified to receive
temporary protection status,157 it is crucial that these processes be accessible to
asylum seekers. As Human Rights Watch reports, however, “delays of up to six
months in registration for temporary protection mean that some refugees are
unable to get basic services and live in fear of being forced to live in a camp or
deported.”158
According to a 2016 report issued by the UNHCR, Turkey has, under a
temporary protection regime, ensured “non-refoulement and assistance in 22
camps, where an estimated 217,000 people are staying.”159 Under the European
Union – Turkey Agreement, matters are further complicated for Syrian refugees
even once they leave Turkey. There are two legal devices by which Greek
authorities may return asylum seekers to Turkey without the necessity of
examining an asylum seekers claim on its merits.160 The first of these devices is
“first country of asylum,” whereby Syrian asylum seekers may be returned to a
country if they possess “sufficient protection” in the first nation as defined under
Article 35 of the EU Asylum Procedures Directive.161 The second of these
devices, known as “safe third country,” allows an asylum seeker to be returned
“to a country where they could have requested and received refugee status.”162
Because Syrians are excluded from Turkey’s Refugee Convention protections
as per geographical limitations, Turkey should not be considered to constitute a
“safe third country.”163 With regard to the first mechanism, its application
depends on whether the asylum seeker is recognized in that country as a refugee
or, in the alternative, provided with “sufficient protection” there.164 As noted,
Syrians are explicitly excluded from refugee status in Turkey.165
According to the UNHCR, sufficient protection means that an asylum
seeker is granted “a right of legal stay and [is to] be accorded standards of
treatment commensurate with [the Refugee Convention] and international
human rights standards,” including for “living, work rights, health care, and
education.”166 Finally, and most critically, the UNHCR has contended that “the
capacity of States to provide protection in practice should be taken into
consideration, particularly if they are already hosting large refugee
populations.”167 Turkey is currently home to more than 2.7 million Syrian
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refugees.168 The nation has felt the prolonged impact of the Syrian refugee crisis,
and the administrative realities of facilitating the safe arrival, departure, and
resettlement of millions of displaced persons are unparalleled.
2. Lebanon
According to a March 2017 factsheet published by the European
Commission on Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, with more than 1.5
million refugees, Lebanon accounts for the highest refugee per capita.169 Since
the outset of the Syrian crisis in 2011, hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees
have fled across Lebanese borders.170 Lebanon is a country with an already
fragile system of government and infrastructure, and both its policies and
practical execution of such directives is indicative of a nation unprepared to meet
the crisis adequately.
The legal framework that exists for the protection of refugees in Lebanon is
troublesome at best. The nation is neither party to the 1951 Convention relating
to the Status of Refugees, nor does it have any domestic legislation that
addresses refugee status protections.171 Syrian asylum seekers, thus, are afforded
no specific status of protection once inside Lebanese borders.172 Furthermore,
the Lebanese government characterizes such migrants as “displaced persons,”
not as “refugees.”173 In October 2014, three years after significant violent
outbreak and upheaval began in Syria, the Lebanese Council of Ministers
adopted an official policy on Syrian displacement, “one explicit goal of which
is to decrease the number of Syrians in Lebanon by reducing access to territory
and encouraging return to Syria.”174 While the Lebanese government was
initially praised by the UNHCR for apparent policies of open borders and the
facilitation of resettlement amidst the regional crisis, field research cited in an
article by Maja Janmyr suggests that these policies were the product of political
stalemate and a literal inability to close access to Lebanese territory before the
influx began.175 Decentralized government response to the crisis led to piecemeal application of rudimentary policies implemented by local authorities in an
attempt to establish control.176 “One of the clearest examples of this municipality
autonomy,” according to Janmyr, was the implementation of curfews on Syrian
refugees, “restricting freedom of movement.”177
Lebanese policy toward mass emigration from Syria can be traced to the
protracted Palestinian issue, which is often cited as evidence as to why many
states in the region have refused to sign on to the 1951 Convention Relating to
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the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.178 Though Lebanon is not party to
the Convention, the nation is bound by the norms of non-refoulement under
customary international law.179 Lebanon, like Turkey, has ratified the major
international human rights instruments. In addition, foundational customary
international human rights principles can be found in the Lebanese
Constitution.180 As Janmyr notes, “[t]he Preamble of the Lebanese Constitution
of 1926 (as amended in 1990) explicitly states that ‘Lebanon is […] a founding
and active member of the United Nations Organization and abides by its
covenants and by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.’”181
Furthermore, it states, “the Government shall embody these principles in all
fields and areas without exception.”182 As is noted by Janmyr, the embodiment
of such principles “without exception” would include Article 14 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights preserving the right of refugees to seek asylum.183
Until 2015, Lebanon did not have a formal framework of domestic legislation in
place for refugees.184 In December 2014, Lebanese authorities instituted a new
set of entry requirements and rules for Syrian refugees “already in Lebanon
applying for and renewing residency permits.”185 Such policies, instituted in
2015, were the first steps in the implementation of the Lebanese “Policy on
Syrian Displacement,” adopted in October 2014.186 Such policies were intended
to deter and prevent Syrian refugees from seeking refuge in Lebanon.187 As
noted by Janmyr, the measures established in 2015 “entail restrictive conditions
that are only applicable to Syrian nationals, and hence are discriminatory in
comparison to other foreigners.”188 Consequently, such policies have left Syrian
refugees vulnerable to exploitation, and in turn, they are faced with two choices:
leave Lebanon or stay in the country and resign themselves to exploitation,
“which in some cases even may amount to forced labour and human
trafficking.”189
Though Lebanon operated an open-door policy for Syrian migrants at the
outset of the conflict, attaining legal residency status required a valid Syrian
identity card or passport and entry through an official border checkpoint.190 After
six months, this “entry coupon” could be renewed free of charge for an
additional six months.191 After a year of residency, however, Syrian refugees
were required to renew their status “at a cost of USD 200 per person/per year for
everyone 15 and above.”192 Syrian refugees residing in Lebanon that either did
not enter through an official border checkpoint, did not possess proper
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documentation, or continued to reside inside Lebanon after their legal residency
status expired were, and still are, subject to arrest, prosecution, and
deportation.193 Because Syrian asylum seekers most often fled their homes with
little money, without proper documentation, and often times were unable to
cross at official border checkpoints, such administrative practices are likely to
add to the already widespread statelessness problem. Most critically, as Janmyr
notes, “[t]his practice has been aggravated by the fact that the Lebanese
Government has declared the Syrian refugee crisis not to be governed by law,
but by governmental decisions.”194 As relayed by one Lebanese lawyer through
an interview cited by Janmyr, “the Syrian situation is not governed by law, but
by security policy.”195 Consequently, domestic law is often ignored in practice
and Syrian asylum seekers are left without recourse.

VI. PRACTICAL CONCLUSIONS UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

The fundamental right to nationality should be considered a norm of
customary international law. As codified in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, the ICCPR, the CRC, and the CEDAW, and as specifically
addressed by the 1951 Convention, the 1954 Convention, and the 1961
Convention, there exists a substantial global legal framework that urges State
Parties to provide equal access to the right to a nationality and to avoid the
creation of stateless persons. Tensions between sovereign authority over
nationality determinations and the right to a permanent grant of nationality,
ultimately, present inherent difficulties to solve immense problems of mass
flight from conflict zones. The only means by which the statelessness problem
might be alleviated is through global cooperation under international law by
acknowledging a customary right to nationality and, in turn, customary
obligations to minimally avoid statelessness.196 It is clear that inconsistencies
between national practices concerning citizenship has further exacerbated the
statelessness issue, as uniform state practice is difficult to establish so long as
such discrepancies exist.197 What remains of paramount concern, however, is
how the international community is to proceed to effectively allay the
statelessness problem in the midst of such an immense crisis absent the ability
to establish uniformity of state practice in citizenship determinations. First and
foremost, domestic considerations must be examined. Maintenance of the
current Syrian Nationality Law as it stands is an active contravention of Syria’s
obligations under international law, and it must be reformed so as to eliminate
provisions that perpetuate gender discrimination in citizenship determinations.
Regional considerations, in practice, are difficult to address.
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Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt currently host more than 5.2
million registered Syrian refugees.198 This figure, though enormous, does not
represent the hundreds of thousands of displaced persons who have not come
forward for registration. Mass flight from the Syrian conflict has caused the
worst humanitarian crisis in nearly two decades, and its impact upon neighboring
nations is unparalleled. Nations bordering Syria were already under extreme
economic duress, and loss of foreign investment, trade, and diminished tourism
revenues as a result of the massive migrant influx have further crippled their
economies. Security risks are immense, and local communities have had to face
the brunt of these difficult circumstances.
On November 2, 2016, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
addressed the Third Committee, commenting on the difficulty in building peace
in the modern world, as “[m]oral and legal boundaries embedded in international
humanitarian law are crossed every day more deliberately, and with more
impunity.”199 The Syrian conflict has resulted from “deep sectarian divisions,
religious extremism, terrorism and governance challenges fueling the
violence.”200 Furthermore, the High Commissioner emphasized that, in dealing
with this immense humanitarian crisis, proximity should not define
responsibility.201 So too, must responsibility for addressing the statelessness
crisis not be defined by proximity to its source. In order for the fundamental
right to an attributed nationality to be fully realized, the global community must
participate in burden-sharing efforts. State engagement is critical. By forcing
neighboring nations to bear a vastly disproportionate burden, ineffective
administrative practices on the ground are furthered and facilitated, exacerbating
the statelessness problem. Though international and sovereign tensions exist
over autonomy to make citizenship decisions, what must remain as the
foundation of global nationality practices is the progressive realization of human
rights and, in turn, the preservation of human dignity.
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